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Abstract
A prize is located at an unknown point on an island. In each period, each
of n players searches a subset of the as yet unsearched portion of the island.
If one player alone finds the prize he wins it and the game ends. Players have
a per-period discount factor and a search cost proportional to area searched.
Efficient symmetric Markov perfect equilibria are characterized when search is
observable. Equilibria for n ≥ 2 exhibit two types of inefficiency: a tragedy of
the commons (for small islands) and free riding (for large islands). For n ≥ 3,
equilibrium properties are non-monotonic: players may be better off searching
larger islands, and larger islands may take less time to search. When search
is unobservable and players are sufficiently impatient, multi-player search can
be efficient. The model is very general: applications include R&D races, team
production, and extraction of exhaustible resources.
Keywords: R&D, search, uncertainty.
JEL classifications: O32.
1 Introduction
Consider pharmaceutical firms participating in an R&D race for drug discovery, or
paparazzi looking for a movie star in city hotels, or researchers looking for solutions to
the six Millennium Prize Problems in mathematics. All these situations are examples
of a common general problem. Namely, a treasure hunt where the prize value is
common knowledge, but the search costs are unknown ex ante. This is the problem
we consider in this paper.
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In particular, we analyze a dynamic model in which a given number of players
search for a treasure hidden somewhere on an island of a given area. The value of the
treasure is common knowledge, and search is costly. Once the treasure is found the
game ends. In each period, all players make their search decisions simultaneously. If
the treasure is not found in the current period, search in the next period occurs over
the remaining unsearched area. If several players find the treasure simultaneously
(search the same part of the island), each of them incurs their costs, but the treasure
will be destroyed (players do not get any treasure).1 We consider the case when
search is observable; that is, during the search players are informed about the areas
that have already been searched by their opponents.2
We analyze a game in which each state is described by the remaining unsearched
area. There are multiple subgame perfect equilibria in the game; we restrict our
attention to the symmetric Markov perfect equilibria (SMPE).3 Among all SMPE,
we only consider the efficient SMPE; that is, the equilibrium with the highest total
expected payoff in the absence of collusion. We find and completely characterize the
unique efficient SMPE when there are one or two players. For more than two players
we can characterize the unique efficient SMPE when the maximum number of search
periods is two.
We compare the efficient SMPE for multi-player search to the case of monopoly.
Relative to the latter, multi-player search is typically inefficient except for very small
islands when players behave as a cartel and search lasts just one period. In general,
there are two types of potential inefficiency. First, in the case of small islands, mul-
tiple players search too fast; the probability of finding a treasure is relatively high,
which means players have an incentive to over-search in the current period. This is
a standard tragedy of the commons effect. It leads to over-investment in comparison
with the case of monopoly. Second, in the case of large islands, players undertake
insufficient search; the probability of finding the treasure is relatively low, so the
immediate payoff from search is negative. Players want others to search and incur
current losses, hoping that the treasure will not be found in the current period. In
other words, there is an incentive to postpone search to a future period, when it will
be more profitable. This is a standard free-riding effect. It leads to under-investment
in comparison with the monopolist. Note that in the present model, in contrast to
the existing literature, both the tragedy of the commons and the free-riding effect
may endogenously arise within the same project.
Since search is costly, it seems natural to conjecture that a smaller island (lower
1This assumption is standard in the R&D literature. Intuitively, if several players discover the
treasure simultaneously, fierce competition between them runs down the surplus to zero. A good
example of such a situation for just two players is Lockheed and Douglas jet development in the
1960s. For more detail, see The Economist (1985); and Chatterjee and Evans (2004). Many examples
of simultaneous discoveries in science can be found in Merton (1973).
2We also consider the case with unobservable search in Section 7.
3Imposing Markov perfection not only makes our analysis simpler, while still being consistent with
rationality, but it also makes our results directly comparable to those in the previous literature. See
Maskin and Tirole (1988), Bhaskar et al. (2010) and Battaglini et al. (2012) for a general discussion
of why the use of SMPE is appropriate.
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search costs) is better than a bigger island for all players. In fact, it turns out not to
be the case. By example, we illustrate that players might be worse off with a smaller
island. This surprising observation, which we refer to as Puzzle 1, means that an
increase in expected costs might make all the players better off. Puzzle 1 has the
following intuitive explanation. If the island is small, the tragedy of the commons
effect is strong, and players oversearch the island. If the island area is increased, the
tragedy of the commons effect decreases, and players search the island more efficiently.
It turns out that with three or more players this efficiency improvement may be large
enough to outweigh the increase in the cost of searching the larger island.
It also seems natural to anticipate that the expected number of search periods
monotonically increases with the island area. As we show in the Example this con-
jecture is also incorrect. In fact, a larger island can either speed up or slow down
the search process. We refer to this observation as Puzzle 2. This puzzle can be
explained by inefficient player behavior when the island is relatively large and there
are multiple players. Due to the free-riding effect, players have a greater incentive to
underinvest. When there are many players, this effect may be very strong, leading to
non monotonicity of the search function. In the extreme case this may lead to non
existence of the efficient SMPE.
In the special case when the cost of searching the entire unsearched area of the is-
land is exactly equal to the treasure value, the tragedy of the commons and free-riding
effects are absent, and multi-player search can reproduce the monopoly outcome. This
happens when the discount factor is sufficiently low, guaranteeing that players search
the island in at most two periods. For this unique island area, players get zero ex-
pected payoff in period one. Consequently the objective function of players is to
maximize their expected payoffs from the second period only. In the second period
in the symmetric equilibrium, each firm receives a payoff proportional to the payoff
of the monopoly. This guarantees that multi-player search reproduces the monopoly
outcome.
There are two alternative interpretations of our model with observable search.
First, as a dynamic game of financing a private good with an uncertain threshold.
Barbieri and Malueg (2010) introduce threshold uncertainty into a private-values one-
period model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. In contrast to their
model, we consider a dynamic game where a private good rather than a public good
is being financed. Second, the reduced form generated in our model resembles the
problem of extraction of exhaustable resources under common access or, equivalently,
a multi-player cake-eating problem.4
We also consider the case when search is unobservable. Our main finding is that,
if players are sufficiently impatient, multi-player search can reproduce the monopoly
outcome. This is the case despite the fact that an arbitrarily large number of players
participate in a non-cooperative dynamic game and history-dependent strategies can
not be relied upon to support cooperation. The result can be explained by the fact
4See for example Long (2011) for a recent survey of dynamics games in the economics of natural
resources.
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that neither the tragedy of the commons nor free-riding effect are possible when search
is unobservable.
In contrast to much of the existing literature, we focus on the dynamics of invest-
ment in relation to private goods. Previous work typically investigates dynamic mod-
els of investment in relation to contributions to public goods.5 Bonatti and Ho¨rner
(2011) is the work that is closest in spirit to our paper. In their framework, two
agents contribute to a public project that can be either good or bad. At any time if
the investment is unsuccessful, the probability of the project being good decreases. In
contrast, in our model unsuccessful search leads to a decrease in unsearched area and
therefore brings the successful conclusion of the project potentially closer. The main
findings of their paper are that: agents always underinvest; deadlines can partly mit-
igate this under-investment problem; and delay is greater when efforts are observable
rather than unobservable. In our model both under-investment and over-investment
are possible, and deadlines are not beneficial because the private-good nature of our
problem implies that the free-riding typically associated with public goods does not
arise. In addition, in our setting when players are sufficiently impatient, they can
behave efficiently if their search efforts are unobservable.
Previous work on private goods mostly deals with situations that are either static
or involve complete information.6 The typical outcome of these models is that firms
overinvest. One of the few papers that considers the dynamics of investment is Rein-
ganum (1981), who shows that in a dynamic R&D race where each firm chooses a time
path of expenditures, firms may underinvest as compared to the monopoly outcome.
Aggregate expenditure on R&D may, therefore, depending on the exogenous parame-
ters, be either too high or too low relative to the monopoly outcome. To simplify the
analysis, Reinganum assumes that the success function is exponential. As a result,
previously acquired knowledge does not change the probability of current success in
the race; that is, the equilibrium strategies may be time-independent. There are
many situations, however, where the memorylessness assumption is not satisfactory;
for example, when the search domain, while potentially large, is finite. Consideration
of this case permits us to shed light on the dynamics of when over-investment or
under-investment are likely to arise.7
Chatterjee and Evans (2004) analyze a R&D race, where two competing firms
simultaneously choose between two research projects, where investment is observable
and it is common knowledge that exactly one of these projects will be successful if
enough investment is made. While agents in their model decide which area to search
(how much they search each period is exogenously determined), agents in our model
decide how much to search (the location has no importance).
5See, for example, Admati and Perry (1991), Marx and Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas
(2002), Compte and Jehiel (2004), Matthews (2012) and Battaglini et al. (2012).
6See, for example, Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a, b) and Lee and Wilde (1980),
and Reinganum (1989) for a literature survey.
7Doraszelski (2003) investigates the parallel question of when the firm that is behind in the race
engages in catch-up behavior. Using simulation, he obtains richer investment dynamics by discarding
the memorylessness assumption. In this paper we derive analytical results in the same vein.
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Our paper is related to the literature on strategic experimentation with publicly
observable actions and outcomes.8 This strand of literature uses the two-armed bandit
framework to model the trade-off between experimentation and exploitation in teams.
In particular, Klein and Rady (2011) assume a negative correlation of the quality of
the risky arm across players. Note that strategic interaction in their model arises
out of purely informational concerns. In our context, Klein and Rady assume that
a player benefits from the other player’s previous periods of unsuccessful search.
However, contrary to us, there is no payoff rivalry among players. In their model all
Markov perfect equilibria are in cutoff strategies. In contrast, in our framework once
players begin searching they stop only if they find the treasure.
Finally, there is a literature that models research contests as rank-order tourna-
ments. In contrast to our paper, this literature analyzes the situation in which there
are multiple potential innovations that compete against each other. Some examples
recently discussed in the literature include: a 1992 refrigerator competition (see Tay-
lor, 1995), a 1829 steam locomotion tournament (see Fullerton and McAfee, 1999), a
1714 British contest for a method of determining longitude at sea (see Che and Gale,
2003). As with the literature on strategic experimentation, and in contrast to our
model, all Markov perfect equilibria in these papers are in cutoff strategies.
2 An Example
Consider the following two-period game. Player i = 1, 2 may search the island of size
x(0) = 1 in two periods, t = 1, 2, in order to find a treasure of value 2. The cost of
searching for either player is linear, C(x) = x, and there is an equal probability that
the treasure will be located at any given point on the island. If players search the
same area and find the treasure simultaneously, each of them incurs their costs, but
the treasure will be destroyed. Payoffs from the second period are discounted at a
common factor δ = 0.75.
First, we consider the case when both players observe the search choices of the
other player. Let us solve the game by backward induction. Consider the second-
period subgame where the treasure is not found in the first period and the unsearched
area of the island is x ≤ x(0). Note that if player i searches I i(2) in the second period
and there is no duplication, then his expected second-period payoff is
2I i(2)/x− I i(2) = I i(2)(2/x− 1).
Provided there is no duplication, each player has a dominant strategy to search
as much as possible in the second period. Therefore in the unique symmetric SPE,
I1(2) = I2(2) = x/2 and the value for player i in the subgame with the unsearched
area of x is
V1(x) = 1− x/2.
8See, for example, Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), Keller and Rady
(2010) and Klein and Rady (2011).
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Now consider the first period. Note that if player i searches I i(1) in the first
period, then his expected payoff from two-period game is
2I i(1)/x(0)− I i(1) + δ(x(0)− I1(1)− I2(1))V1(x(0)− I1(1)− I2(1)),
where player i incurs searching cost of I i(1), gets immediate expected payoff of
2I i(1)/x(0), and anticipates the expected payoff of δ(x(0)− I1(1)− I2(1))V1(x(0)−
I1(1)− I2(1)) in the second period. Simplifying the above expression yields
I i(1) +
δ
2
(1− I1(1)− I2(1))(1 + (I1(1) + I2(1))).
The first-order conditions with respect to I i(1) are
1− δ(I1(1) + I2(1)) = 0.
Whenever I1(1) + I2(1) ≤ x(0) = 1 and provided there is no duplication, player i
has incentives to search as much as possible in the first period. Consequently, there is
a unique symmetric SPE that involves each player finishing the search in one period by
searching a complementary half of the island; that is, I1(1) = I2(1) = x(0)/2 = 1/2.
Player i’s value in the two-period game with the island size of x(0) = 1 is V2(1) =
1
2
.
Next, consider the case when only one player (a monopolist) searches the island
in two periods. Similar to the argument above, one can define the monopolist’s value
in the second-period subgame with an unsearched area of x as
V1(x) = 2− x.
Consider the first period now. If the monopolist searches I(1) in the first period,
his expected payoff from the two-period game is
2I(1)/x(0)− I(1) + δ(x(0)− I(1))V1(x(0)− I(1)).
Simplifying the above expression yields
I(1) + δ(1− I(1))(1 + I(1)) = I(1) + δ(1− (I(1))2).
The first-order conditions with respect to I(1) give
1− 2δI(1) = 0.
Consequently, there is a unique SPE that involves searching 2/3 of the island in
the first period and the remaining 1/3 of the island in the second period if necessary;
that is, I(1) = 2/3 and I(2) = 1/3. The value for the monopolist of the two-period
game with the island size of x(0) = 1 is V2(1) =
13
12
.
Finally, we consider the case when players do not observe the search choices of
the other player. Specifically, we assume that each player searches in two periods
without observing what area has been searched by the other player. To make this
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case consistent with the observable case, it is assumed that before any search is
undertaken, players coordinate on how to divide the island in two equal parts. Then
the strategy of each player is what portion of his own land, and the other player’s
land, to search each period. Note that if a player searches the area associated with
the other player, there could be some duplication.
Let us show that the efficient equilibrium derived earlier could be supported as
a Nash equilibrium when the search choices are unobservable; that is, each player
searches 2/3 of his own area in the first period and 1/3 of his own area in the second
period (if necessary), and neither player searches the area associated with the other
player. First, given that in the proposed equilibrium both players search efficiently,
they have no incentive to deviate by changing the division of search between the first
and the second periods of their own portion of the island – this is the optimal search
strategy they could adopt. Second, let us show that players also have no incentive
to search the area associated with the other player. A player can deviate from the
equilibrium described, by searching the other player’s area either in the first or in the
second period. Given that in the second period the other player finishes the search
in his area, searching the area of the other player in the second period is clearly
disadvantageous. On the other hand, searching the other player’s area in the first
period by ǫ would generate an additional payoff of
−ǫ+ 2ǫ(1− 2/3) = −ǫ/3.
The first term is the cost of searching the other player’s area, while the second term
is the expected benefit to the deviator who searches ǫ, while the ‘incumbent’ searches
2/3 of his area. Given that the search by the ‘incumbent’ is unobservable, it is assumed
that from the deviator’s prospective, the ‘incumbent’ searches his area randomly. As
one can see the combined effect is negative for any positive ǫ. Consequently neither
player has an incentive to deviate by searching the other player’s area.
Thus, when the search is observable, players search too fast. This is what we
refer to as the tragedy of the commons effect. The total value of the game for two
players is W2 = 2V2 = 1. On the other hand, when search is unobservable, players
search efficiently and W2 = 2V2 =
13
12
. Note that these results are consistent with the
findings of Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011).
3 The Model
There are n ≥ 1 players. They are looking for a treasure which is hidden somewhere
on an island. The treasure has the same value R > 0 for all players, and there is an
equal probability that the treasure will be located at any given point on the island.9
Denote the area player i searches in period t as I i(t). Let the unsearched area of the
island at period t be given by x(t). The size of the island is assumed to be x(0) > 0.
9We focus our attention on uniform distribution because this is the most realistic assumption
when there is no information about the island. See Section 8 for further discussion.
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At period t = 0 all players simultaneously choose how much to search for the
treasure. The search is costly. If player i searches I i (0), his search cost is −I i (0). It
is assumed that if players search the same area and find the treasure simultaneously,
each of them incurs costs, but the treasure will be destroyed.10 Consequently, in
equilibrium players never search the same area. All players together search
J (0) = I1 (0) + ...+ In (0) .
Note that given players never search the same area and searching outside the island
has no benefit, it must be the case that J (0) ≤ x (0).
If J (0) = x (0), player i has a I
i(0)
x(0)
probability of finding the treasure, and the
game ends. Player i obtains the following expected payoff:
I i (0)
x (0)
R− I i (0) .
If J (0) < x (0), player i has a I
i(0)
x(0)
probability of finding the treasure, and the
game ends with probability J(0)
x(0)
. If the treasure is not found at period t = 0 (this
happens with probability 1− J(0)
x(0)
), the unsearched area of the island shrinks to x (1) =
x (0)− J (0), and the game proceeds to the next period t = 1.
At period t > 0, each player knows the history h(t) = (x(0); J(0), ..., J(t − 1))
and all players simultaneously choose how much to search for the treasure on the
previously unsearched area of size x (t). Given that players never search the same
area and searching the previously searched area has no benefit, it must be the case
that J (t) ≤ x (t).
If J(t) = x(t), player i has a I
i(t)
x(t)
probability of finding the treasure. The expected
payoff for player i is
δt
I i(t)
x(t)
R− (I i(0) + δI i(1) + ...+ δtI i(t)),
where δ is the common discount factor, and the game ends.
If J(t) < x(t), player i has a I
i(t)
x(t)
probability of finding the treasure, and the game
ends with probability J(t)
x(t)
. If the treasure is not found at period t (this happens with
probability 1− J(t)
x(t)
), the unsearched area of the island shrinks to
x(t + 1) = x(t)− J(t).
The new unsearched area is equal to the previous one, minus the searched part.
We assume that each player observes how much the other players have searched
previously before making his search plans.11 Note that all search costs are sunk, but
10An alternative assumption is discussed in Section 8.
11Section 7 considers the case when search is unobservable.
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only one player (if any) can find the treasure. Moreover, the value of the prize is
known from the beginning, but the search costs for each player will be determined
only at the end of the game.
Player i’s strategy is an infinite sequence of functions specifying how much to
search each period contingent upon any possible sequence of previous searches. The
game we consider is stochastic, and any history can be summarized by the “state”,
the current unsearched area. We will consider only Markov strategies in which the
past influences the current play only through its effect on the current unsearched
area. A pure Markov strategy for player i is a time-invariant map I i : X → X ,
where X = [0, x(0)]. We also will restrict our attention only to symmetric equilibria.
Therefore, the solution concept is a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (SMPE).12
Moreover, because in general there exist multiple SMPE, we focus on the efficient
SMPE; that is, the equilibrium with the highest total expected payoff in the absence
of collusion.13
We use the following approach to obtaining the efficient SMPE. Player i takes the
state-contingent investment plans of his rivals as given; these plans can be aggregated
to obtain I−i(x). Given this function, player i solves a standard optimization problem
and chooses his optimal investment, I i(x). However, given that the function I−i(x)
is endogenous to the model, to obtain the symmetric equilibrium we need to find the
function I−i(x) such that (n−1)I i(x) ≡ I−i(x), where I i(x) is the optimal investment
for player i when he takes I−i as given.
Player i solves the following Bellman equation:
V (x) = max
0≤Ii≤x−I−i
−I i + I
i
x
R + δ
(
1− I
i + I−i
x
)
V (x− I i − I−i), (1)
where x is the part of the island which is still unsearched before the current period,
V (x) is the value function for each player (we use the symmetry assumption here) and
the solution has to satisfy (n − 1)I i = I−i. The first term in equation (1) describes
the player’s costs of search in the current period. The second term is the player’s
expected value from finding the treasure in the current period. The last term is the
player’s expected value from future periods.
Define that part of x which player i does not search in the current period by
y = x− I i
and the part of x no player searches in the current period by
z = x− (I1 + ...+ In) = y − I−i.
12We discuss both subgame perfect and asymmetric Markov perfect equilibria in Section 8.
13If two efficient SMPE have the same total expected payoff, it is assumed without loss of generality
that the efficient SMPE with the largest number of potential search periods is selected. This criterion
guarantees that the efficient SMPE is unique.
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Equation (1) can be rewritten in the following way
V (x) = max
I−i≤y≤x
{−(x− y) +R(x− y)/x+ δzV (z)/x}. (2)
Note that x, y, z, R and V (x) are of the same unit measure. For convenience,
we assume without loss of generality that R = 1 to work with unit free variables.
Equation (2) transforms into
V (x) = max
I−i≤y≤x
{−(x− y) + (x− y)/x+ δzV (z)/x}. (3)
To simplify the exposition, it is convenient to introduce the following function:
Ψ(x) ≡ xV (x). (4)
From definition (4), it follows that
Ψ(x) ≥ 0 for any x.
Equation (3) in terms of Ψ(x) can be rewritten as
Ψ(x) = max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1− x)(x− y) + δΨ(z)}, (5)
and the solution has to satisfy n(x− y) = x− z, where for simplicity I = I i.
4 Alternative Interpretations
In this section we introduce two alternative interpretations of the model with observ-
able search.
4.1 Private good provision with uncertain threshold
There are n ≥ 1 players, who want to finance a private good as a team. The threshold
of investment at which the good of value R becomes available is not known, but the
players know that the threshold is distributed uniformly from 0 to some value x. In
each period, all players simultaneously choose how much to contribute. If player i
contributes I i, his cost is I i. All players together contribute
J = I1 + . . .+ In.
Note that since investing more than x has no benefit but is costly, it must be the
case that J ≤ x. If J < x, players have a J/x probability of financing the private
good in the current period. If they are successful they share value R in proportion to
their contributions; that is, player i gets Ii/J of the good (or gets R with probability
Ii/J). If they are unsuccessful, the game is repeated next period with the threshold
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distributed uniformly from 0 to x − J , where future payoffs are discounted by the
common discount factor δ. If J = x, players finance the private good in the current
period. They share value R in proportion to their contributions, so that player i
gets Ii/J of the good. One can see that the Bellman equation (1) describes this
game. To our knowledge, our model is the first to consider a dynamic process of team
investment in which the total cost to complete the project is uncertain.
4.2 Extraction of exhaustable common-pool resources
There are n ≥ 1 firms, who each period choose simultaneously how much of a non-
renewable resource to extract. The resource endowment is given by x and all firms
have common access to the resource. If firm i extracts I i in the current period, it
derives net utility of Ui = (1 − x)I i from selling the resource in the market. Firm
i maximizes a discounted sum of utilities, where δ is the common discount factor.
It is evident that the Bellman equation (5) describes this game. Note that when
x > 1, net utility from selling the resource in the market is negative; this assumption
diverges from the current literature. Our setup leads to some interesting results, non-
monotonicity of both the value and search functions for example, that are new to the
existing literature on the economics of natural resources.
5 Analysis of the Model
In this section we derive a general procedure for finding the efficient SMPE. First, to
rule out cases where no investment is made in equilibrium we introduce the following
definition.
Definition 1. A SMPE is trivial if I(t) = 0 ∀ t.
We want to focus our attention on SMPE that are non-trivial. Before outlining the
first lemma, we introduce the following operator B on the set of continuous functions
(BΨ)(x) ≡ max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1− x)(x− y) + δΨ(z)}. (6)
Lemma 1.
(a) Any non-trivial SMPE involves I(t) > 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and I(t) = 0 for t > T ,
where T is finite.
(b) All SMPE can be obtained in a finite number of steps applying the following
sequence {Ψk}, where
Ψ0 ≡ 0, Ψk ≡ BΨk−1, k = 1, 2, . . .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that with the help of Lemma 1, one can construct the sequence {Ψk} and find
all SMPE. This is called the value-iteration procedure. This procedure is equivalent
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to using backward induction. In general, there will be multiple SMPE. For simplicity
we focus on the unique efficient SMPE.
5.1 Construction of Ψ1 and V1
Let us start from the end of the search process. What will be the value of the game
if players could only search for at most one period? Equation (5) transforms into
Ψ1(x) = max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1− x)(x− y)}. (7)
It is evident that the optimal y can be described in the following way14:
y =
{
x, if x > 1,
(n− 1)I, if x ≤ 1.
If x ≤ 1, then in SMPE players search the whole island, I1 + ... + In = nI = x.
Consequently,
y =
(n− 1)x
n
and z = 0 if x ≤ 1.
Therefore the solution of (7) is
Ψ1(x) =
{
P1(x), if x ≤ u1 = 1,
0, if x > u1 = 1,
(8)
where u1 = 1 is the largest positive root of polynomial P1(x) = x(1−x)/n. For future
reference note that
P1(x) =
a1
n
(1− x)2 + b1
n
(1− x) + c1
n
, (9)
where
a1 = −1, b1 = 1, c1 = 0.
If players can search the island for at most one period, then the only SMPE is
(I(x), ..., I(x)), where
I(x) =
{
x
n
, if x ≤ u1 = 1,
0, if x > u1 = 1.
Define the value of the game for each player (if the players can search the island for
at most k periods) as Vk(x) ≡ Ψk(x)/x, for any x ≥ 0. From the above definition, it
follows that
V1(x) =
{
(1− x)/n, if x ≤ u1 = 1,
0, if x > u1 = 1.
14Note that if x = 1, then any y ∈ [(n− 1)I, x] is optimal. We assume that players choose
y = (n− 1)I in this case.
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5.2 Construction of Ψ2 and V2
What will be the value of the game if players can search the island for at most two
periods? In general there could be three possibilities, depending on the island size.
The first possibility is that the players search the island for just one period. Intuitively
this happens for small values of x because it is too costly to wait for another period
when the island is very small. The second possibility is that the players search the
island for at most two periods. This happens for middle values of x. Finally, players
can find search to be too costly, and abstain from searching at all. This happens
when the initial island is large (costs are very high).
We have already considered the first possibility in the previous section. Now we
analyze the situation when players plan to search for at most two periods. The first
step is to construct Ψ2(x). Equation (5) in this case transforms into
Ψ2(x) = max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1− x)(x− y) + δΨ1(z)}. (10)
The necessary condition for y to be optimal in the interior of [0, x] is
−(1 − x) + δΨ′1(z) = 0. (11)
In order to continue the search for the second period, the remaining island size has
to satisfy
0 ≤ z ≤ u1. (12)
The sufficient condition for y to be optimal in the interior of [0, x] is satisfied because
Ψ′′1(z) = a1 < 0.
The way to proceed is to construct the equilibrium with the help of condition (11),
and then show that the derived equilibrium satisfies condition (12).
From expressions (11) and (8), it follows that
−(1− x) + δ
(
1− 2z
n
)
= 0.
Consequently,
z(x) =
n(x− 1) + δ
2δ
. (13)
It is now straightforward to show that
y =
(n− 1)x+ z(x)
n
=
2δ(n− 1)x+ n(x− 1) + δ
2δn
. (14)
Substituting (14) and (13) into equation (10), we obtain a spline of degree two on
13
the interval [0, u2]
15:
Ψ2(x) =

Ψ1(x), if 0 ≤ x ≤ t1,
P2(x), if t1 < x ≤ u2,
0, if x > u2,
(15)
where u2 > 0 is the largest positive root of polynomial
P2(x) =
a2
n
(1− x)2 + b2
n
(1− x) + c2
n
, (16)
with
a2 = −1− s, b2 = 1
2
, c2 =
δ
4
,
and
s =
n(n− 2)
4δ
. (17)
In order to find u2, we need to solve the quadratic equation P2(u2) = 0. It is easy
to check that
u2 = 1 +
√
4δ(s+ 1) + 1− 1
4(s+ 1)
.
The point x = t1 is the first knot of the spline. When x = t1 players are indifferent
between searching the island for two periods or for just one period:
Ψ1(t1) = Ψ2(t1). (18)
From (9) and (16), we get16
t1 = 1− δ
n
. (19)
All our calculations so far are valid for any n ≥ 1. Consider parameter s now.
From expression (17), it follows that
s

< 0, if n = 1,
= 0, if n = 2,
> 0, if n ≥ 3.
(20)
Condition (20) characterizes three different types of behavior in SMPE. There are
three cases: n = 1 (a monopoly); n = 2 (a duopoly); and n ≥ 3 (an oligopoly).
It is straightforward to check that the solution given by (15) satisfies condition
(12) for any x ∈ [t1, u2]. Therefore, if the players can search the island for at most
15A spline is a special function defined piecewise by polynomials, see for example Ahlberg, Nielson,
and Walsh (1967).
16 Condition (18) can have one or two solutions: one is given by (19), the other one exists only if
n > 2 and is equal to t1 = 1+
δ
n−2
. If n = 1, both solutions to (18) coincide. If n = 2, there is only
one solution, which is given by (19). Finally if n ≥ 3, it is easy to see that Ψ1(1 + δn−2 ) < 0, which
means that only (19) is relevant.
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two periods, then y(x) is a spline of degree one on the interval [0, u2] with one knot
x = t1:
y(x) =

(n−1)x
n
, if x ≤ t1,
2δ(n−1)x+n(x−1)+δ
2δn
, if t1 < x ≤ u2,
x, if x > u2.
The efficient SMPE (if the players can search the island for at most 2 periods) is also
a spline of degree one on the interval [0, u2] with one knot x = t1:
I(x) =

x
n
, if x ≤ t1,
(2δ−n)x+n−δ
2δn
, if t1 < x ≤ u2,
0, if x > u2,
(21)
and the value function is
V2(x) =

V1(x), if x ≤ t1,
P2(x)/x, if t1 < x ≤ u2,
0, if x > u2.
We can describe the construction of Ψk and Vk now. In the next subsection we
obtain a complete characterization of the functions Ψk, Vk and derive the efficient
SMPE in the cases of n = 1 and n = 2. If n ≥ 3, then finding the efficient SMPE is
not always feasible, which we illustrate in Section 6.
5.3 Construction of Ψk and Vk when n = 1 and n = 2
What will be the value of the game if players can search the whole island for at most
k ≥ 3 periods? In general there could be k + 1 possibilities, depending on the island
size x(0). The players can plan to search the island for at most 1, 2, ..., k periods, or
not to search at all.
First, let us construct Ψk(x). Equation (5) in this case transforms into
Ψk(x) = max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1− x)(x− y) + δΨk−1(z)}. (22)
A necessary condition for y to be the optimal value in the interior of [0, x] is
(1− x) = δΨ′k−1(z). (23)
In order to continue search for the next period, the new value of x has to satisfy
tk−2 ≤ z ≤ uk−1, (24)
where t0 = 0. The sufficient condition for y to be the optimal value in the interior of
[0, x] is satisfied if
Ψ′′k−1(z) < 0. (25)
We will use condition (23) to find z, and then show that it satisfies conditions
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(24) and (25). Note that if function Ψk−1(x) in (22) is a quadratic polynomial,
then Ψk(x) = BΨk−1(x) has to be a quadratic polynomial as well. Since P1(x) and
P2(x) are quadratic polynomials by (9) and (16), any Pk(x) can be represented in the
following form:
Pk(x) =
ak
n
(1− x)2 + bk
n
(1− x) + ck
n
, k ≥ 1. (26)
From condition (23) and expression (26), it follows that
z(x) = 1 +
δbk−1 + (1− x)n
2δak−1
. (27)
It is now straightforward to show that
y = x+
z − x
n
= x+
(1− x)(n+ 2δak−1)
2δnak−1
+
bk−1
2nak−1
. (28)
Hence
Ψk(x) = −(1− x)
(
(1− x)(n+ 2δak−1)
2δnak−1
+
bk−1
2nak−1
)
+ δΨk−1(z).
Define the largest root of polynomial Pk(x) as uk, and that value of x such that
players are indifferent between planning to search the area for k periods or for k − 1
periods as knot tk−1:
Ψk−1(tk−1) = Ψk(tk−1). (29)
For the moment, let us assume that equation (29) has a unique solution. The unique-
ness of the solution will be proved later in Lemma 2. Substituting (27) and (28)
into equation (22), we obtain a spline of degree two on the interval [0, uk] with knots
t1, ..., tk−1:
Ψk(x) =

Ψk−1(x), if 0 ≤ x ≤ tk−1,
Pk(x), if tk−1 < x ≤ uk,
0, if x > uk,
(30)
where Pk(x) is defined in (26). Therefore, if players plan to search the island for at
most k periods, then y(x) is a spline of degree one on the interval [0, uk] with knots
t1, ..., tk−1:
y(x) =

(n−1)x
n
, if x ≤ t1,
x+ (1−x)(n+2δa1)
2δna1
+ b1
2na1
, if t1 < x ≤ t2,
...
x+ (1−x)(n+2δak−2)
2δnak−2
+ bk−2
2nak−2
, if tk−2 ≤ x ≤ tk−1,
x+
(1−x)(n+2δak−1)
2δnak−1
+
bk−1
2nak−1
, if tk−1 < x ≤ uk,
x, if x > uk.
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I(x) is also a spline of degree one on the interval [0, uk] with knots t1, ..., tk−1:
I(x) =

x
n
, if x ≤ t1,
− (1−x)(n+2δa1)
2δna1
− b1
2na1
, if t1 < x ≤ t2,
...
− (1−x)(n+2δak−2)
2δnak−2
− bk−2
2nak−2
, if tk−2 ≤ x ≤ tk−1,
− (1−x)(n+2δak−1)
2δnak−1
− bk−1
2nak−1
, if tk−1 < x ≤ uk,
0, if x > uk;
and the value function is
Vk(x) =

P1(x)/x, if x ≤ t1,
P2(x)/x, if t1 < x ≤ t2,
...
Pk−1(x)/x, if tk−2 ≤ x ≤ tk−1,
Pk(x)/x, if tk−1 < x ≤ uk,
0, if x > uk,
or
Vk(x) =

Vk−1(x), if 0 ≤ x ≤ tk−1,
Pk(x)/x, if tk−1 < x ≤ uk,
0, if x > uk.
Let us now find ak, bk, and ck for any k ≥ 2. Using (22), (26) and (27), we get
the following result17:
Theorem 1. When n = 1 and n = 2
ak = −1 + s
ak−1
, bk = − bk−1
2ak−1
, ck = δ
(
ck−1 −
b2k−1
4ak−1
)
, k ≥ 2, (31)
where
s =
n(n− 2)
4δ
,
and
a1 = −1, b1 = 1, c1 = 0. (32)
Theorem 1 describes all coefficients of the quadratic polynomials Pk(x) when n = 1
and n = 2. Let us consider these two cases separately.
The following proposition characterizes the spline in (30) and the knots when
n = 1.
17 Note that if ak−1 = 0, the optimal sequence includes k − 1 steps only. This result follows from
Lemma 2, and will be discussed at the end of the Lemma’s proof.
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Proposition 1. When n = 1, system of difference equations (31) with initial condi-
tions (32) has the following solution:
ak = −sin (k + 1)ϕ
2v sin kϕ
, bk =
vk−1 sinϕ
sin kϕ
, ck =
v2k−1 sin (k − 1)ϕ
2 sin kϕ
, (33)
tk = 1− vk cos kϕ, uk = 1 + v
k(sin kϕ− sinϕ)
sin (k + 1)ϕ
, k ≥ 1, (34)
where v =
√
δ, and ϕ = arccos v.18
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following proposition characterizes the spline in (30) and the knots when
n = 2.
Proposition 2. When n = 2, system of difference equations (31) with initial condi-
tions (32) has the following solution19:
ak = −1, bk = 1
2k−1
, ck =
(
(4δ)k−1 − 1
4k−1(4δ − 1)
)
δ, (35)
tk = 1− 3δ + (4δ)
k(δ − 1)
2k(4δ − 1) , uk = 1 +
1
2k
(√1− (4δ)k
1− 4δ − 1
)
, k ≥ 1. (36)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, we demonstrate that conditions (24), (25) hold, and equation (29) has a
unique solution.
Lemma 2. For n = 1 and n = 2 and any value of x, (30) satisfies conditions (24)
and (25), and is the unique solution to (29).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to complete the description of the efficient SMPE, we have to specify the
maximum number of search periods for any value of x (i.e. we allow x to vary and
find the maximum number of search periods). We will do that in the next subsection.
5.4 Maximum number of search periods when n = 1 and n = 2
In this subsection, we want to answer the following question: what is the minimum
number k such that V (x) ≡ Vk(x)? In other words, what is the maximum number
18Note that sin kϕ = 0 implies ak−1 = 0 as in footnote 17.
19These expressions are presented in this concise form (rather than as sums) for expositional
purposes. In particular, note that both numerators and denominators in ck, tk and uk contain
(1 − 4δ) term. When δ = 1/4, these expressions are defined as their limits as δ → 1/4.
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of periods (the worst case scenario) in which the treasure will be found for certain?
Note that, in general, the answer to this question depends on the discount factor δ.
One way to answer the above question is to write the condition that the largest
positive root of the quadratic polynomial Pk(x) coincides with the largest positive
root of the quadratic polynomial Pk+1(x). This condition gives a critical value of δ;
for slightly larger values of δ, there is an additional search period. This means that
k is the smallest integer such that Ψk(x) ≡ Ψk+1(x), or in other words V (x) ≡ Vk(x).
Since such k depends on δ, let us define for each n a knot discount factor δk(n) which
is the solution to the following equation:
uk(δk(n)) = uk+1(δk(n)), k ≥ 2. (37)
The knot discount factor δk(n) “connects” two regions: V (x) ≡ Vk(x) ≡ Vk+1(x)
for 0 < δ < δk(n), and V (x) ≡ Vk+1(x) 6≡ Vk(x) for δk(n) < δ < 1. The following
theorem characterizes the knot discount factors for n = 1 and n = 2.
Theorem 2. If n = 1, equation (37) has the following unique solution:
δk(1) = cos
2 π
k + 1
, k ≥ 2. (38)
If n = 2, equation (37) can be simplified to
(1− δk(2))2(1− (4δk(2))k) = 1− 4δk(2), k ≥ 2. (39)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates δk(n) for n = 1 and n = 2. For example, if n = 1 and δ = 0.4,
the maximum number of search periods is equal to three. This means that for any
initial value of x(0), in any non-trivial SMPE the project will be finished in three or
fewer periods.
We can see that there is a monotonic convergence of δk → 1 when k → ∞. This
convergence is easy to prove by taking a limit k → ∞, and applying it to (38) and
(39). One possible interpretation of this result is that if n = 1 or n = 2 and δ < 1,
players search the island either for a finite number of periods or not at all. Note that
this result is consistent with part (a) of Lemma 1.
5.5 Tragedy of the commons or free riding
We have described the efficient SMPE for the cases of n = 1 and n = 2. Let us use
derived results to provide some intuition for the general problem.
Consider equation (5):
Ψ(x) = max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1− x)(x− y) + δΨ(z)}.
Note that Ii = (x − y) is the current search area for player i. We observe two main
effects in the model: tragedy of the commons and free riding. The first effect works if
19
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Figure 1: Different zones
the value of x is small, 0 < x < 1. In this case the first term in equation (5) is positive,
(1 − x)(x − y) = (1 − x)Ii > 0. In a multi-player case, each player has incentives
to increase his current expected payoff by searching more. In the equilibrium players
over-search, which is a standard tragedy of the commons effect. The second effect
is present for larger values of x, namely when x > 1. In this case the first term in
equation (5) is negative, and players have incentives to decrease their current losses
and undertake insufficient search. This is a standard free-riding effect. If the island
size is x = 1, then neither of the effects is present. Figure 2 illustrates these effects:
tragedy of the commons (for x < 1) and free riding (for x > 1). For small values of
x, the aggregate search, Jn(x), is the same for n = 1 and n = 2; players search the
whole island for just one period. On this part of the graph, both curves coincide. For
larger values of x but still less than one, the curve for n = 2 is above the curve for
n = 1. This means that the monopolist, n = 1, searches the island efficiently, while
in the case of two players, n = 2, the tragedy of the commons effect takes place, and
players search the whole island too fast. Finally, we can see that the curve for n = 1
is above the curve for n = 2 when x > 1. Free riding takes place on this interval, and
two players search the island too slowly relative to the monopolist. Note also that
due to the tragedy of the commons and the free-riding effects, there are values of x
for which the monopolist finds search profitable, even though two players prefer not
to search.
20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.00
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
x
J(x
)
n=2
n=1
Figure 2: Jn(x): n = 1 is a dashed line, n = 2 is a solid line; δ = 0.75.
6 Three or More Players
If n ≥ 3, then solving for Vk(x) with the help of the value-iteration procedure is a
much more tedious task.20 Moreover, neither SMPE may be efficient for larger values
of x. To illustrate the difficulties and present some interesting and unexpected results,
we use the following example.
Example 1
Suppose that n = 4 and δ = 0.99. Using the value-iteration procedure described in
subsection 5.3 for n = 1 and n = 2, we derive the following quadratic polynomials21:
P1(x) =
1
4
(−(1 − x)2 + (1− x)),
P2(x) =
1
4
(−3.0202(1− x)2 + 0.5(1− x) + 0.2475),
P3(x) ≈ 1
4
(−1.6689(1− x)2 + 0.0828(1− x) + 0.2655),
P4(x) ≈ 1
4
(−2.2105(1− x)2 + 0.0248(1− x) + 0.2639),
and
P5(x) ≈ 1
4
(−1.9139(1− x)2 + 0.0056(1− x) + 0.2613).
20Note that V1(x) and V2(x) are derived in the previous section for any n.
21Note that the values for coefficients in P3(x), P4(x) and P5(x) are approximate.
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Figure 3: W (x) = 4V (x).
Figure 3 illustrates the combined four-player value function (W (x) = 4V (x)) for
n = 4 and δ = 0.99, where the value function is given by
V (x) =

P1(x)/x, if x ≤ 0.7525,
P2(x)/x, if 0.7525 < x ≤ 0.9481,
P3(x)/x, if 0.9481 < x ≤ 1.0702,
P5(x)/x, if 1.0702 ≤ x ≤ 1.2448,
P3(x)/x, if 1.2448 < x ≤ 1.3748,
0, if x > 1.3748.
(40)
Let us consider the value function V (x). First, as we can see from Figure 3, the
value function is not monotonic in x. This means that a larger island could make all
players better off. Second, as we can see from (40), the maximum number of search
periods is five, and it is never optimal to plan searching for four periods.22 Since the
number of search periods is not monotonic in x, it is possible to finish the project
more quickly when the island is larger. 
Let us call these surprising observations puzzles, and examine each in turn.
Puzzle 1. Non-monotonicity of the value function. A larger island can
make all players better off.
It seems natural to expect that a larger island will make players worse off. How-
22We use numerical calculations to confirm that it is not optimal to search for more than five
periods.
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ever, consider two island sizes
x˜ = 0.75251 < 0.7526 = x̂.
Using (40), we get
V (0.75251) = P2(0.75251) = 4.6563× 10−2
and
V (0.7526) = P2(0.7526) = 4.6586× 10−2.
In this case, a larger island makes all players better off. This puzzling observation
can be explained by inefficient player behavior when x is relatively small. Due to
the tragedy of the commons effect, players search the smaller x˜ too fast in the first
period, and leave too little for the second period search. If the size of the island is
increased to x̂, players search the island more slowly and efficiently. This efficiency
improvement is large enough to outweigh the increase in the cost of searching the
larger island.
The following proposition demonstrates that this result holds whenever there are
at least n = 3 players.
Proposition 3. For any n ≥ 3, there exists x > t1 such that V (x) > V (t1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Puzzle 2. Non-monotonicity of the search function. A larger island can
speed up or slow down the search process.
It seems natural to expect that the maximum number of search periods monoton-
ically increases with island size. However, consider the following island sizes
x1 = 1 < x2 = 1.1 < x3 = 1.3.
Using (40), we find that searching islands of sizes x1 and x3 takes at most three periods
while searching an island of size x2 takes at most five periods. This implies that there
is no monotonicity with respect to the number of search periods. Moreover, players
never plan to search the island for at most four periods. This puzzling observation
can be explained by inefficient player behavior when the island size is relatively large,
and there are many players. If this effect is sufficiently strong, the efficient SMPE
may not exist.
The intuition for non existence of the efficient SMPE is as follows. There are
always multiple SMPE in the model but we only consider the efficient SMPE where
players obtain the highest expected payoff. In such an equilibrium, players make
their optimal search plans before the search starts. However, if the first-period search
is unsuccessful, then the original search plan might no longer be optimal for the
remaining unsearched area of the island. This is exactly what is happening in this
example. When x = 1.1 players obtain the highest expected payoff if they plan to
search for five periods. In the first period, they together search J(1.1) ≈ 0.0142, which
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Figure 4: W1(x) is a solid line, W2(x) is a dashed line, W3(x) is a dotted line; δ = 0.5.
results in new x ≈ 1.0858. As we can see from (40), when x ≈ 1.0858 it is optimal
to search for at most five periods. This means that the original five-period search
plan is based on a four-period search plan, which does not provide players with the
highest expected payoff. In other words, for larger island sizes, namely x > 1.0702,
even though some SMPE exist, none of them is efficient. Note that the value function
given by (40) does not constitute SMPE because it is history dependent. Also, the
non existence of the efficient SMPE is only possible with 3 or more players. This is
because when there are at least 3 players, the free-riding effect may be sufficiently
strong, leading to strong non monotonicity of the search function. This means that
even though players always play individually optimal strategies in every state, as a
team they may not. That is, equilibrium strategies may be payoff inefficient for some
states.
We conclude this section with investigation of multi-player search efficiency.
Puzzle 3. Efficient search.
It is intuitive that the monopolist searches efficiently. It is also intuitive that multi-
player search reproduces the monopoly outcome when the island is small; players
search the whole island in just one period. However, efficient search is not limited
only to small islands. If the island size is x = 1 and δ ≤ 0.5, players also search
efficiently. If the combined n-player value function is defined as Wn(x) = nVn(x),
then
Proposition 4. When 0 < δ ≤ 0.5, Wn(1) = W1(1) for any n ≥ 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 4. It shows the combined value function when
one, two, three, or four players search the island and δ = 0.5. Note that for δ ≤ 0.5
and x ≤ 1, the project is completed in at most two periods, which means that the
constructed equilibrium for x ≤ 1 is the efficient SMPE. Note also that the total value
function at x = 1 is the same in all four cases. Since for x = 1 neither the tragedy of
the commons nor the free-riding effect is present, the multi-player search reproduces
the monopoly outcome. This result has the following intuitive explanation. For
this unique island size, players get zero expected payoff in period one of the two-
period search. Consequently the objective function of players is to maximize their
expected payoffs from the second period only. In the second period in the symmetric
equilibrium, each firm receives a payoff proportional to the payoff of the monopoly.
This guarantees that multi-player search reproduces the monopoly outcome.
7 The Unobservable Case
To contrast our findings with Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011) we consider the following
extension where investments are unobservable. Specifically, we assume that every
period each of n players searches without observing what areas have been searched
by other players. To make this extension consistent with the rest of the paper, we
assume that before any search is undertaken, players coordinate on how to divide the
island in n equal parts. The strategy of each player is what area of his own portion of
the island, and the other players’ portion, to search each period. Note that if players
search the areas associated with other players, there could be some duplication. In
the next proposition we show that if players are sufficiently impatient, the efficient
search can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. Formally,
Proposition 5. There exists 0 < δ∗ < 1 such that for ∀ δ ≤ δ∗, and ∀ n ≥ 2,
Wn(x) ≡W1(x).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This means that not only is there less under or over-investment when player effort
is unobservable (compared to the observable case), but players also search efficiently
provided they are sufficiently impatient. The intuition for this result is as follows.
When players are impatient, the efficient search requires covering relatively large
areas each period. Given that the search choices are unobservable, it is not beneficial
to search the areas associated with other players, who are assumed to search their
own areas randomly; hence there is a positive probability of duplication. On the
other hand, when players are sufficiently patient, the efficient search requires covering
relatively small areas each period; it may be worth searching the areas of other players.
Consequently, when players are sufficiently patient, they have to search faster than
the monopolist.23
23The general case when players are sufficiently patient is not easily tractable. However, all
our attempts to construct an example where the unobservable case leads to more inefficiency in
comparison with the observable case were unsuccessful.
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8 Discussion
The only dynamic R&D races that search literature has so far investigated rely on the
memorylessness property of the exponential distribution. In contrast in this paper,
we dealt with the case in which the success function is uniform. First, we identify
two types of inefficiencies in the model: a tragedy of the commons (for small islands)
and free riding (for large islands). This differs from the literature, where only one of
these inefficiencies is present for a single project. Second, expanding on the previous
literature, we also investigate a multi-player case with three or more players, and
demonstrate that in this case there is no monotonicity; players can be better off if
the race is longer, even though such a race is more costly, and a longer race may take
less time to finish.
Let us discuss some of the important assumptions we made in this paper. First
of all, we assume that there is an equal probability that the treasure will be located
at any given point on the island. This assumption fits well the realistic case where
there is no initial information on the possible location of the treasure. It also makes
the analysis tractable. However, the case in which the distribution is not uniform has
been discussed in the literature, see for example Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997),
Choi and Gerlach (2011) and Chatterjee and Evans (2004). The expected outcome in
our setting is that players start searching the parts of the island where the treasure
is most likely to be found.24 However, the possible complication here is that it is not
clear when, if at all, the project will finish. For instance, the optimal strategy could
be to first search areas with a relatively high chance of success and, in the event of
non-discovery, suspend the search because it becomes too costly and unprofitable.
Second, we assume that the treasure can be destroyed. However, there are many
situations when players can share the treasure if it is jointly discovered. If players can
share the treasure, it might lead to an additional inefficiency; all players duplicate if
the island is small. However, using a similar approach, one can construct the efficient
SMPE for this game. We expect that it would not make the model richer except for
aforementioned additional inefficiency.
Third, the solution concept in the observable case is the efficient SMPE. There
also exist asymmetric Markov perfect equilibria, where in every period each player
searches a different amount (they split a pie in different proportions). Using a similar
approach, one can construct the efficient asymmetric Markov perfect equilibria for
this game. We expect that the procedure would be more tedious but would not
make the model qualitatively different. In addition, there exist other, non-Markovian
symmetric equilibria. One can define “grim-trigger” strategies similar to those used in
Compte and Jehiel (2004). In the case of small islands, the only symmetric equilibrium
that exists is the efficient SMPE. Players can always finish the search in one period,
so “grim-trigger” strategies are not useful in supporting cooperation. In contrast
in the case of large islands, with a large number of potential investment periods,
“grim-trigger” strategies can improve cooperation. However, given that the search is
24Choi and Gerlach (2011) show that players start from the easiest project in R&D competition.
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inefficient for small islands, it will be inefficient for large islands as well. Consequently,
in the observable case efficient search can not be supported even with “grim-trigger”
strategies.
Fourth, the assumption about one prize is very common in the theoretical R&D
literature.25 We make an additional assumption that the prize has to be located on
the island. However, given that players are assumed to be risk-neutral, one can always
qualify this assumption by assuming that the prize is located on the island with some
positive probability, and the players are searching for the expected value of the prize.
Finally, there are some situations when a player benefits even if another player
finds the treasure. For example, by imitation a rival may be able to capture some of
the profits generated by an innovation. It could be an interesting extension of our
project when players have positive or negative externalities on each other. We leave
this extension for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
First, if n = 1, part (b) of the Lemma follows directly from the contraction mapping
theorem (see for example Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989)). However this theorem is not
useful for part (a) or when a multi-player game is considered. Consequently, we will provide
a different proof, which will cover both single-player and multi-player games. For future
reference note that given that the function (1−x)(x−y) in equation (5) is continuous, Ψ(x)
is also continuous.26
To prove (a), first consider the case when x is arbitrarily small and apply an argument
similar to Admati and Perry (1991). Specifically, from equation (5) the marginal benefit
of searching additional area in the first period is equal to the value that is arbitrarily close
to 1, while the marginal benefit of postponing the search by one period is less than δ < 1.
Consequently, it is a dominant strategy for each player to finish the search in one period.
For the remaining values of x, suppose (a) is not satisfied. First, if I(t) = 0 for some
t = tˆ, stationarity implies investment remains zero for ∀ t > tˆ. Hence, there are finitely
many search periods. Assuming that the game lasts an infinite number of periods, this
means that investment in some periods will take arbitrarily small values, i.e. for ∀ ε0 > 0
∃ ε ∈ (0, ε0) and ∃ t ∈ N such that I(t) = ε and nε≪ x. From (5) it follows:
Ψ(x) = (1− x)ε+ δΨ(x− nε). (41)
Expanding equation (41) in Taylor series around ε = 0 implies
Ψ(x) = −(1− x)ε
1− δ +O(ε) = O(ε). (42)
25See Reinganum (1989) for more detailed discussion about this assumption.
26See for example proposition 1 in Ericson and Pakes (1995) for a standard technique to prove a
similar result.
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This means that Ψ(x) could be arbitrarily close to zero. For values of x < 1 which are
not arbitrarily small this is not possible, because each player will have incentive to deviate
by choosing I = x−(n−1)ε and generating Ψ(x) = (1−x)(x−(n−1)ε) > 0. When x = 1 a
similar argument applies; in the first period a player has an incentive to deviate by making
a positive contribution, for example I = 0.5. In this case, Ψ(1) = δΨ(0.5− (n− 1)ε). Given
that Ψ(x) is not arbitrarily close to zero when x < 1, Ψ(1) is also not arbitrarily close to
zero.
When x > 1 a slightly different proof is used. For a given size of island x(0) > 1, each
player makes a positive search I > 0 in the first period. Assuming that the game lasts an
infinite number of periods, the investments have to take arbitrarily small values, i.e. for
∀ ε0 > 0 ∃ ε ∈ (0, ε0) and ∃ t ∈ N such that I(t) = ε, where x > 1. From equation (42) it
follows that when I(t) = ε, Ψ(x) is arbitrarily small. However, in the first period players
make a positive search I > 0, which means they incur an immediate negative payoff of
(1 − x(0))I. Subsequently, they make additional searches which add additional negative
payoffs. Overall, this argument implies that Ψ(x(0)) is negative, which is a contradiction.
Thus, I(t) cannot be arbitrarily close to zero, which means there exists ζ > 0 such that
I(t) > ζ ∀ t. Consequently in any non-trivial SMPE the project has to be finished in a
finite number of periods. This establishes part (a) of the Lemma.
Given that the project has to be finished in a finite number of periods, backward induc-
tion can be applied. Namely, we assume that Ψ0 ≡ 0 and derive Ψ1 ≡ BΨ0. This allows us
to find all potential SMPE of the game if players could search for at most one period. Then
we derive Ψ2 ≡ BΨ1, which allows us to find all potential SMPE of the game if players
could search for at most two periods. We continue this process until T is reached and find
all potential SMPE of the game if players could search for at most T periods. Note that if
n = 1 there always exists a unique equilibrium. If n > 1 SMPE is not necessarily unique.
This establishes part (b) of the Lemma and concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Derivation of ak, bk and ck
Let us show that when n = 1, equation (33) is the solution to the system of difference
equations (31).
Define
Rk = v
k ·
k∏
j=1
aj k = 1, 2, . . . (43)
Using (31), one gets the following second-order difference equation:
Rk+1 = vRk ·
(
−1− 1
4δak
)
= −vRk − 1
4
Rk−1 k ≥ 2. (44)
The initial conditions are R0 = 1 and R1 = −v. The characteristic equation
4z2 + 4vz + 1 = 0 has two complex roots
z1 =
−v + ir
2
, z2 =
−v − ir
2
, r =
√
1− v2 > 0.
Denote ϕ = {arg z1 ∈ [0, π/2]} = arccos v; then z1,2 = − e±iϕ2 . Further, write the
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solutions to equation (44) in the form Rk = Az
k+1
1 −Bzk+12 , and use the initial conditions
to get A = B = − isinϕ . Consequently
Rk = − i
(−2)k+1 sinϕ(e
i(k+1)ϕ − e−i(k+1)ϕ) = −sin [(k + 1)ϕ]
(−2)k sinϕ . (45)
Apply (43) and (31) to get
ak =
Rk
vRk−1
= −sin (k + 1)ϕ
2v sin kϕ
, (46)
bk = − bk−1
2ak−1
=
vk−1 sinϕ
sin kϕ
, (47)
ck = δ
[
ck−1 −
b2k−1
4ak−1
]
=
v2k−1 sin (k − 1)ϕ
2 sin kϕ
. (48)
Derivation of tk
To find tk, one needs to solve the quadratic equation Pk(tk) = Pk+1(tk); namely
(ak+1 − ak)(1− tk)2 + (bk+1 − bk)(1 − tk) + ck+1 − ck = 0, k ≥ 1. (49)
Substitute ak from (46) to derive
ak+1 − ak = sin (k+1)ϕ2v sin kϕ − sin (k+2)ϕ2v sin (k+1)ϕ = sin
2 (k+1)ϕ−sinkϕ sin (k+2)ϕ
2v sinkϕ sin (k+1)ϕ =
sin2 ϕ
2v sinkϕ sin (k+1)ϕ .
Substitute bk from (47), and note that v = cosϕ to derive
bk+1 − bk = v
k sinϕ
sin (k+1)ϕ − v
k−1 sinϕ
sinkϕ =
2vk sinϕ(cosϕ sinkϕ−sin (k+1)ϕ)
2v sin kϕ sin (k+1)ϕ =
−2vk sin2 ϕ cos kϕ
2v sin kϕ sin (k+1)ϕ .
Substitute ck from (48), and note that v = cosϕ to derive
ck+1 − ck = v
2k+1 sinkϕ
2 sin (k+1)ϕ − v
2k−1 sin (k−1)ϕ
2 sin kϕ =
v2k(cos2 ϕ sin2 kϕ−sin (k+1)ϕ sin (k−1)ϕ)
2v sinkϕ sin (k+1)ϕ =
v2k sin2 ϕ cos2 kϕ
2v sinkϕ sin (k+1)ϕ .
Substitute the above relationships into (49), and cancel the non-zero common term
sin2 ϕ
2v sin kϕ sin (k+1)ϕ to derive
(1− tk)2 − 2vk cos kϕ(1− tk) + v2k cos2 kϕ = (1− tk − vk cos kϕ)2 = 0.
Consequently,
tk = 1− vk cos kϕ.
Note that both solutions to Pk(tk) = Pk+1(tk) coincide, which means that the solution is
unique.
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Derivation of uk
To find uk, one needs to solve the quadratic equation Pk(uk) = 0, namely
ak(1− uk)2 + bk(1− uk) + ck = 0, k ≥ 1. (50)
Substitute (46), (47) and (48) into (50) to get
−(1− uk)2 sin (k + 1)ϕ + 2(1− uk)vk sinϕ+ v2k sin (k − 1)ϕ.
Solving this quadratic equation results in
uk = 1 +
vk(sin kϕ− sinϕ)
sin (k + 1)ϕ
.
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Derivation of ak, bk and ck
Let us show that when n = 2, formula (35) describes the solution to the system of difference
equations (31). It is straightforward to derive ak = −1 and bk = 12k−1 . The expression for
ck in (31) can be simplified to
ck = δ(ck−1 + 1/4
k−1). (51)
Introduce a new variable ek = ck4
k. Equation (51) transforms to
ek = 4δ(ek−1 + 1),
where e1 = 0. The solution to this linear difference equation is ek =
4δ−(4δ)k
1−4δ . Substitute
ck = ek/4
k to derive
ck =
4δ − (4δ)k
(1− 4δ)4k .
Derivation of tk
To find tk, one needs to solve the quadratic equation Pk(tk) = Pk+1(tk), namely
ak(1− tk)2 + bk(1− tk) + ck = ak+1(1− tk)2 + bk+1(1− tk) + ck+1, k ≥ 1.
From equation (35), ak = ak+1 = −1; consequently,
tk = 1 +
ck+1 − ck
bk+1 − bk .
Substitute bk and ck from equation (35) to derive the following indifference points
tk = 1− 3δ + (4δ)
k(δ − 1)
2k(4δ − 1) .
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Note that the solution to the quadratic equation Pk(tk) = Pk+1(tk) is always unique.
Derivation of uk
To find uk, one needs to solve the quadratic equation Pk(uk) = 0, namely
ak(1− uk)2 + bk(1− uk) + ck = 0, k ≥ 1.
Substituting ak = −1 from equation (35) and solving the above quadratic equation gives
uk = 1 +
√
b2k + 4ck − bk
2
. (52)
Note that with the help of (35), one can simplify:
b2k + 4ck =
(4δ)k − 1
4k−1(4δ − 1) . (53)
Substitute equation (53) into equation (52) to get
uk = 1 +
√
1−(4δ)k
1−4δ − 1
2k
. (54)
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2
First, let us show that condition (24) is satisfied; that is, tk−2 ≤ z ≤ uk−1. Let us prove
the first part z ≤ uk−1 by contradiction, assuming that z > uk−1. Refer to equation (22),
which is written below:
Ψk(x) = max
(n−1)I≤y≤x
{(1 − x)(x− y) + δΨk−1(z)}.
Given x ≥ y ≥ z > uk−1 ≥ . . . ≥ u2 ≥ u1 = 1, it follows that the first term (1 − x)(x − y)
has to be non-positive. If z > uk−1, then the second term δΨk−1(z) is negative. That means
the whole expression on the right of equation (22) has to be negative. Obviously that could
not be an optimal choice for a player because by choosing y = x, that is, by not searching,
a player can get the value of zero. Consequently, there is a contradiction, and condition
z ≤ uk−1 is proved.
Now let us show that tk−2 ≤ z. When n = 1, we prove this inequality by contradiction,
assuming that z < tk−2. Note that by construction, when z < tk−2, the following condition
holds: Pk−1(z) < Pk−2(z). That implies that instead of using the original k-period path
(searching x−y in the first period and making a further k−1 searches according to Pk−1(z)),
the monopolist could use a (k − 1)-period path (searching the same amount x − y in the
first period, and making a further k − 2 searches according to Pk−2(z)), and increase the
value. Refer to equation (22): both paths have the same first term, while the second term
is larger for the (k − 1)-period path. This implies that the k-period path does not improve
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the value in comparison with the optimal (k − 1)-period path, which means that whenever
z < tk−2, the k-period path is not optimal. Condition tk−2 ≤ z is thus proved when n = 1.
When n = 2, let us prove the above condition directly. From equation (27) and
Proposition 2, it follows that z(x) = 1 − 21−k − 1−x
δ
. It is easy to see that z(x) is a
monotonically increasing function in x. Consequently, it is sufficient to prove the above
condition for x = tk−1. Substituting values derived in Proposition 2 and simplifying gives
3δ + (4δ)k−1(δ − 1)
δ(4δ − 1) ≤
1 + 2δ + 2(4δ)k−2(δ − 1)
4δ − 1 .
Further simplifications result in (4δ)
k−2−1
4δ−1 ≥ 0, which is satisfied for any k > 2.
Second, let us show that condition (25) is satisfied; that is, Ψ′′k−1(z) < 0. From equation
(30), it is clear that the sufficient condition for Ψ′′k−1(z) < 0 is that P
′′
i−1(z) < 0 ∀ i =
2, . . . , k − 1. From equation (26), it is easy to see that the above condition is equivalent to
ai−1 < 0 ∀ i = 2, . . . , k − 1. For n ≥ 2, it is straightforward to show that s ≥ 0. From (31),
one can see that ak is a sum of two negative numbers; consequently, it has to be negative.
Now let us prove this condition for n = 1. Substitute tk from (34) into (26) to get
Pk(tk) =
v2k−1
2n sin kϕ
(− sin (k + 1)ϕ cos2 kϕ+ 2 sinϕ cos kϕ+ sin (k − 1)ϕ). (55)
Use the fact that
sin (k + 1)ϕ = sin (k − 1)ϕ+ 2 sinϕ cos kϕ
and substitute into (55) to derive
Pk(tk) =
−δkak sin2 kϕ
n
. (56)
Wherever the value function at tk−1 is positive, ak−1 has to be negative.
Next, for the proof that condition (29) has a unique solution, see the proofs of Propositions 1
and 2. In the case of n = 1, both solutions to (29) coincide; while in the case of n = 2, the
second solution does not exist.
Finally, given that all necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied, results derived
in Theorem 2 and Propositions 1 and 2 are consistent. In particular, this means that if
ak−1 = 0, the optimal path includes k − 1 steps only. A direct way of proving this result is
to notice that if ak−1 = 0 in equation (56), it results in Pk−1(tk−1) = 0, which means that
the k-th step is unnecessary. 
Proof of Theorem 2
First, let us prove the result for n = 1. Equation (37) (which defines δk) is equivalent to
the condition Rk = 0 (Rk is defined in (43)). Apply (45) to get
ϕk : (k + 1)ϕ = nπ, (57)
where n ≥ 1 is some integer which can be different for different values of k, i.e. n = nk.
Let us prove by induction that nk = 1 ∀ k. It is easy to see that for k = 2 the statement is
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correct, i.e. ϕ2 = π/3 and δ2(1) = cos
2 π/3 = 1/4. Substitute k′ = k + 1 in (57) to get
nk+1π = (k + 1)ϕk+1 ≤ (k + 1)ϕk = k + 1
k
π < 2π.
Note that we are using the inductive hypothesis that nk = 1 and the fact that ϕk =
arccos
√
δk is monotonically decreasing in k. Given that nk+1 is an integer, it must be
the case that nk+1 = 1. Substitute n = 1 in (57) to get ϕk = π/(k + 1), which means
δk(1) = cos
2 pi
k+1 , k ≥ 2.
Next let us prove the result for n = 2. Substitute tk from equation (36) and uk from
equation (54) into equation (37) to get
1 +
√
1−(4δ)k
1−4δ − 1
2k
= 1− 3δ + (4δ)
k(δ − 1)
2k(4δ − 1) .
Simplify the above expression to√
1− (4δ)k
1− 4δ − 1 =
3δ + (4δ)k(δ − 1)
(4δ − 1) .
Further simplifications give √
(4δ)k − 1
4δ − 1 =
((4δ)k − 1)(1 − δ)
(4δ − 1) ,
and √
(4δ)k − 1
4δ − 1 (1− δ) = 1. (58)
Square both sides of equation (58) to derive equation (39). This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3
When x = t1 players are indifferent between searching the island for two periods or for one
period:
V1(t1) = V2(t1).
Let us show that V ′2(t1) > 0 for n ≥ 3, which means that there exists a value of x which is
“slightly” larger than t1 (x > t1) such that V (x) = V2(x) > V (t1):
V ′2(t1) =
(
P2(x)
x
)′
x=t1
> 0. (59)
Applying (16) and (19) transforms inequality (59) to
V ′2(t1) = a2 −
a2 + b2 + c2
(1− δ/n)2 > 0. (60)
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With the help of (16) and (17), inequality (60) simplifies to
n2(2n− 6− 2δ) + δ(10n − 4δ) > 0. (61)
When n ≥ 4, the above inequality always holds because both terms on the left are positive.
When n = 3, inequality (61) simplifies to
δ(12 − 4δ) > 0,
which is also valid. The proposition therefore is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Let us prove this proposition in two steps. First, let us show that when 0 < δ ≤ 0.5, knot
t2 ≥ 1 for any n ≥ 1, which implies V (1) = V2(1) for any n. Applying (34) when n = 1
gives t2 = 1 − v2 cos 2ϕ = 1 − δ(2 cos2 ϕ − 1) = 1 + δ(1 − 2δ). It is easy to see that t2 ≥ 1
when 0 < δ ≤ 0.5. Applying (36) when n = 2 gives t2 = 1 − 3δ+16δ
2(δ−1)
4(4δ−1) = 1 +
3
4δ − δ2.
It is easy to see that t2 ≥ 1 when 0 < δ ≤ 34 . Applying (31) when n ≥ 3, one can derive
a2 = −1 − s, b2 = 12 , c2 = δ4 , a3 = −1+2s1+s , b3 = 14(1+s) and c3 = δ
2
4 +
δ
16(1+s) . When
n ≥ 3, it is easy to see that a3− a2 = 1+ s− 1+2s1+s = s
2
1+s > 0, b3− b2 = 14(1+s) − 12 < 0, and
finally c3 − c2 = δ16(1+s) − δ4(1− δ) = δ(4δ
2−3δ−(1−δ)n(n−2))
4(4δ+n(n−2)) < 0 when 0 < δ ≤ 34 . To find t2,
one needs to solve the quadratic equation P2(t2) = P3(t2), namely
a2(1− t2)2 + b2(1− t2) + c2 = a3(1− t2)2 + b3(1 − t2) + c3,
which gives
t2 = 1 +
b3 − b2 +
√
(b3 − b2)2 − 4(a3 − a2)(c3 − c2)
2(a3 − a2) .
It is easy to see that t2 > 1 when 0 < δ ≤ 34 .
Second, one needs to show that nV2(1) is the same for any n. Applying (26) gives
nV2(1) = c2 =
δ
4 . The proposition is thus proved. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Let us prove the statement for δ∗ = 14 . In this case the efficient equilibrium involves at
most two periods, see equation (38). First, given that in the proposed equilibrium both
players search efficiently, they have no incentive to deviate by changing the division of
search between the first and the second period – this is the optimal search strategy they
could adopt. Second, let us show that they also have no incentive to search the areas
associated with the other players. They can deviate from the proposed equilibrium, by
searching these areas either in the first or in the second period. Given that in the second
period the other players finish the search in their areas, searching these areas in the second
period is clearly disadvantageous. On the other hand, searching these areas in the first
period by ǫ would generate additional payoff of
−ǫ+ ǫ(x− I)
x2
, (62)
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where I is given in (21) when n = 1. The first term is the cost of searching the other players’
areas, while the second term is the expected benefit to the deviator who searches ǫ, while
the ‘incumbent’ searches I. Given that the search by the ‘incumbent’ is unobservable, it is
assumed that from the deviator’s prospective, the ‘incumbent’ searches his area randomly.
One can show that the combined effect given by (62) is negative for any positive ǫ when
δ ≤ 14 . Consequently neither player has an incentive to deviate by searching the other
players’ areas. 
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